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SUEZ 1956: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF LAW
by ROBERT R. BowIE. New York: Oxford University Press. Appen-
dices, footnotes, index. 1975. Pp. xix + 148. $7.50 cloth.
M. Cherif Bassiouni*
The nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal by
Egypt on July 26, 1956, was a most significant occurrence in contempo-
rary international affairs because of the chain of events it triggered. The
1975 publication of this book attests to that fact as well as to the continued
timeliness of the subject it covers. Indeed, the Suez Canal, which was
closed in June 1967, has been cleared and officially reopened for navi-
gation on June 6, 1975.
In response to the nationalization of the company, the Western world
rose up against President Nasser of Egypt, whose challenge to their eco-
nomic and strategic interests signaled the decline of Western imperialism
in that part of the world. France and Great Britain's interests coincided
with the Israeli interest in maintaining military supremacy over Egypt. As
a result, France, Great Britain, and Israel conspired to attack Egypt-on
October 29, 1956, the attack began. During the U.N. debates which fol-
lowed, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in almost unprecedented united posi-
tion against the tripartite aggression, co-sponsored a U.N. resolution on the
withdrawal of France, England, and Israel, and the placing of the United
Nations Emergency Force between Egypt and Israel. In April 1957,
Egypt reopened the Suez Canal for navigation and has since remained in
control of its operation.
The story of the Suez Canal may never end, because it is a vital stra-
tegic and economic passage linking the Red Sea and Indian Ocean with
the Mediterranean. The fact that the Western world has the most to gain
from the Canal partially explains the reason why most accounts of the
events of 1956 published in the United States are biased in favor of West-
ern interests.' This book, while accurate in its contents, is nevertheless
not among the exceptions to that current. As an illustration of this fact,
the book confuses several issues. Among these are nationalization of the
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law. LL.B. Cairo University; J.D.
Indiana University; LL.M. John Marshall Law School; S.J.D., George Washington
University.
1. E.g., H. FINER, DULLES OVER SUEZ (1964); Hostie, Notes on the Inter-Stat-
ute oj the Suez Canal, 31 TUL. L. REV. 397 (1957); Gross, Passage through the Suez
Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israeli Ships, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 530 (1957).
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Suez Canal company, a company organized and subject to Egyptian com-
pany law, and Egypt's sovereign rights over the Canal proper, an artificial
waterway dug exclusively in Egyptian territory.2 Clearly, Egypt has cer-
tain international obligations with respect to the right of free and innocent
passage through the Canal. However, Egypt's right to nationalize a do-
mestic company -is beyond question and should not be confused with
Egypt's international obligations concerning navigational transit.
The nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal, an
Egyptian company, is treated as if it were an international public body,
which it clearly was not. Questions of management and control of the
Canal's operation are confused with questions of transit rights and restric-
tions thereto.3 Furthermore, the nationalization of the company is not
treated as a simple act of a nationalization recognized under international
law subject to adequate, just, and prompt compensation. Even then, his-
torical facts relevant to nationalization and just compensation are omitted.
Among such facts is the history of the company which had nineteen years
remaining on its concession to operate this artificial waterway, which was
dug by Egyptian labor at the cost of some one hundred thousand lives and
with the financial support of Egypt amounting to nearly all the actual cost
of the project. 4 Nevertheless, Egypt did not mitigate or reduce its com-
pensation to company stockholders and did indeed declare at the time of
the nationalization its willingness to pay the full market value of the na-
tionalized shares of stock of the Suez Canal company and did so shortly
thereafter.
Indeed the complete legality of the nationalization and the full and fair
compensation to its stockholders which ensued should not only be so recog-
nized, but it should be held out as a model of fairness. This has not hap-
pened, however, since political interests required that Egypt be made to
appear as the villain.
The author follows the events of the time in the order in which they
occurred. He also faithfully reiterates the arguments advanced by those
who were paving the way for their subsequent acts. The failure to ade-
quately comment on the political motives of such countries as France and
England is a serious omission. Historical accuracy and critical analysis
should have revealed what the world had almost twenty years to find out.
The author furthers arguments which have been made against Egypt
2. Bassiouni, The Nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Illicit Act in Inter-
national Law, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 258 (1965).
3. See, e.g., R. BowiE, SuEz 1956: INTERNATIONAL CMSIS AND THE ROLE OF
LAw 2-3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BowIE].
4. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 269-71.
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by confusing Egyptian economic concessions to the Suez Canal company
with international legal obligations. The purported effect of this approach
is to demonstrate that Egypt's economic concessions to the company's pro-
moter, Ferdinand de Lesseps, and to the Suez Canal company proper,
were in the nature of an international dedication of the Suez Canal. This
was one of the legal strategies of the Western powers, who created in Lon-
don between August and September 1956 a "user's club." The "users"
sought recognition of an international right to control the Canal on the
grounds that operational control was crucial to the exercise of their inter-
national right; namely, the right of free passage. Part of their plan was
to show that Egypt's inability to manage or properly use the Canal would
jeopardize the right of free passage, guaranteed under the 1881 Constan-
tinople Convention, and thus warrant the take-over of the Canal by the
"users." Professor Bowie fails to explain this plan whereby the "users"
and the former Suez Canal company officials conspired with the Suez
Canal pilots to leave Egypt. Their departure was to evidence Egypt's
inability to operate the Canal, thus giving the "users" valid reasons
to seize the Canal, under the pretext of fulfilling international obligations
to insure free passage through the canal for the world. This effort failed,
however, because Egyptian naval officers and civilian navigation pilots as-
sumed the task, which they performed well, of leading vessels through the
Canal. 5 The author of this book doesn't mention this plan which was cru-
cial to the "users'" strategy of claiming the internationalization of the
Canal and the control of its operation. Instead, he states: "How could
the users ensure that Nasser would manage the Canal efficiently and not
misuse its control to serve his political purposes."6
The subtitle of the book indicates its emphasis on the role of law in
the resolution of this "crisis." In that respect, Egyptian efforts at a
peaceful solution are accurately presented, but in the context of an at-
tempt to extol the virtues of John Foster Dulles as the principle protagon-
ist of a "peaceful settlement."' 7 Considering Dulles' role in making the
crisis by sponsoring the "user's club" and proposing an internationalization
of the Canal which would, in fact, perpetuate foreign control of Egyptian
territory and property, it is hardly to be commended. Dulles, however,
deserves and is given due credit by the author, as is President Eisenhower,
for their firm stand at the U.N. in condemning the actions of France,
5. See K. LOVE, SuEz: THE TWICE Fouorr OVER WAR (1969); A. NuTrINo, No
END OF A LESSON (1967); ROBERTSON, CRISIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUEZ CON-
sPIRAcY (1965).
6. Bowm at ix.
7. Id. at 35-47.
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Great Britain and Israel, and causing their withdrawal from occupied
Egyptian territory.
The book condemns Egypt for its denial of Israel's right to transit the
Canal, but fails to present Egypt's arguments for the denial. The 1881
Constantinople Convention gives Egypt the right to refuse passage for de-
fensive reasons, as do other international law principles. 8 However, even
though Egypt's position is criticized on that issue, the author fails to men-
tion that Great Britain did just that to Germany in World Wars I and II
without as much as a whisper of protest by anyone. Further, the author
completely ignores the context of Egypt's denial of navigation rights to Is-
raeli vessels and Israeli-bound cargo; namely, the existence of a state of
war between Egypt and Israel. The question of navigation rights deserved
more than the scant treatment it received, for it is still a contemporary
problem.
In his conclusion the author chides Israel for its aggression: "Despite
the violations of Israel's rights, it was still hard to square its resort to force
with the provisions of the Charter." As to the aggression of France and
Great Britain, the author concludes: "Their case for self-help was less
clear [than Israel's]; they had not exhausted efforts for a peaceful solu-
tions. ... l0 However what the author refers to as "Israel's rights" and
France and England's "case for self-help" is far from convincing.
A noteworthy observation about this book concerns its sources of au-
thority: throughout, there is only one reference to an Egyptian author'
and few authors cited are sympathetic to the Egyptian position. 12 All other
works cited are U.S. and British authors and governmental sources which
are either unsympathetic to the Egyptian position or who condemn it.
There are, however, several Israeli and pro-Israeli authors cited repeat-
edly.' s
8. See Khadduri, Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping, 33 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1968); but see Gross, supra note 1.
9. BowIE at 104.
10. Id.
11. M. EL-HEFANAOUi, LES PROBLAMES CONTEMlPORAINS POSS PAR LE CANAL DE
SUEZ (1951).
12. See LOVE, supra note 5; ROBERTSON, supra note 5; Khadduri, supra note 8.
13. E.g., FINER, supra note 1; see also Bowm at 55, 59, 93 (Ben Gourion);
BOWIE at 56 (Dayan); BOwIE at 56-57 (Bar-Zohar); BowIE at 56-59 (Peres); BowIE
at 57 (Kimche).
14. See, e.g., Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal
Questions, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 277 (1957).
15. The author does however cite ROBERTSON, supra note 5; LovE, supra note 5;
NUTriNo, supra note 5, whose insights are quite revealing. For a contrary position
see FINER, supra note 1; EL-HEFANAOUI, supra note 11; see also M. & S. BROMBERO,
SECRETS OF SuEz (1957) (discussing France's political motives).
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The book offers a good chronology of the events and a concise state-
ment of the Western position. The documents it contains are of great his-
torical interest; however, there is no adequate presentation of the legal is-
sues involved 14 and only a superficial political appraisal of the events re-
counted. 15 It would have otherwise been a welcome contribution.
